The globalization has a particular relation to the climate change, and conversely, the climate change also has a particular relation to the globalization. They live and exist together and often they are mentioned together. It is however clear that the globalization can exist problemless without the climate change, while this can also be declared from the climate change. Nature and society have always been in a secret dialogue with each other, forming visible and invisible oppositions, taking over the role of the other and embodying universal values for the other side. Actually, we have an important change in the secret dialog. It is not about the fact, that this change is historical in the history of the nature. Until now, we protected the nature against the society, now we must also protect the society against the nature. The decisive change is the transformation of the idea of the nature protection in a practice of the mutual and double protection of the nature and the society.
Introduction


The globalization has a particular relation to the climate change, and conversely, the climate change also has a particular relation to the globalization.
They live and exist together and often they are mentioned together. It is however clear that the globalization can exist problemless without the climate change, while this can also be declared from the climate change.
Later, this difference will have its importance. Since there are however two phenomena of universal, quite total extensiveness, we have a long range of facts and interpretations testifying that the emergence of the globalization and that of the climate change have already been relatively early mixed with each other. A particularly important example is the Chernobyl disaster, which constituted one of the most important stages of the awareness of the new endangerment of a new type of the nature, while the same disaster, together with its processing by Michail Gorbachev, was also an important stage on the way of the ultimate commencement of the globalization (we mean the year 1989).
The long history of the human culture contains numerous memories of natural disasters. As a rule, they appear as gods' clear acts of revenge, of superhuman forces, because the sins of the humanity have so cried against the sky.
These disasters manifested thus particular stages of a secret dialogue between nature and society.
The Secret Dialogue
In this dialogue, the nature has always been seen as the side that stands, which is eternal, and in this eternity faces the society, the human nature and the human destiny are moving in many different ways but after all unsteady. So the nature becomes contrast to the society, to the human nature and to the human destiny.
The modern societies become step by step conscious of their furious dynamics, they are experiencing the constant transformation of the politics, of the economy and of the intellectuality. The same is also referring to the human nature, which variability alone already becomes a permanent shock, but also a permanent experience, and again the same is referring to the human destiny, to the happiness, to the death and life in that ever quicker modern dynamics, which gradually emerges from the god-hidden universalism.
Towards them, the nature remains eternal and immutable, its laws are also immutable, the permanence is then also confirmed by Newton, so that Newton's mechanics and the divine omnipotence can even come to a not marginal or peripheral isomorphic relation.
The nature is a book that one must open up and subsequently always must learn from it (Jean-Jacques Rousseau). Rousseau's man is certainly not any exclusive realization of man experiencing the general dynamics, in him, our determining contrast is however shown most clearly, which carries the secret dialogue between society and nature. The book of the nature always contains the same text, man must learn this text by heart, also to escape the dynamics, however already because the human nature itself already becomes, in constant struggle for the recognition, a place of the permanent unhappiness.
Even the earthquake in Lisbon confirms this picture, which may seem a bit surprising given the relatively late date in the eighteenth century (1755). The concept of permanent coherence of the nature was so strongly integrated that Lisbon earthquake caused a real philosophical turn, a revolution. The revolution was not directed against the nature or against any concrete natural forces, it was directed as a new polarization against God himself. It means that even God or the religious attitude had to change when the intention of the nature changed. This is also an indirect confirmation of our thesis. The eternity of the nature always seemed to have been so powerful, that every strong movement of the nature was inevitably conceived as a concrete message and not rarely even as an anticipated judgment. Thus, the old Teutons (just to name one example) interpreted the sudden onset of darkness as divine judgment. In literary terms, Mark Twain probably immortalized this phenomenon in his novel A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (1889).
This was one side of the secret dialogue, this part meant: the nature is silent, it speaks rarely, but then all the more meaningful. The power of the shock in Lisbon was so important that it shook the faith. According to the traditions and the media of that time, one might see that in every skepticism as a spontaneous and sincere event of the forms of the mass psychology of that time, everyone knows Voltaire's Candide (1759), who does not only see this shock as an accomplished fact, but already amuses himself (and the readers)...
And the nature was still for a long time the other face of the society, for only after Rousseau, that direction came, which one generally calls romanticism. In the romanticism, the landscape appeared, at least also often as a place of peace and tranquility as it appears today as a place of natural disaster. The romanticism is also a direction and a way of thinking, that has survived far beyond its given historical period of time, and as, amongst others, we can aptly know from Hermann Broch's Kitsch theory, goes on living in the near future in the articulations of the mass culture, of the fine arts, of the everyday poetry, of the kitsch, and in the thousand forms of entertainment culture.
It also means that-intentionally or unintentionally-the nature of the place of peace and self-reflection, of the place of the forests and flowers, of the place of deer and gracious berries goes on living intensely up today. The romanticism never dies, and with the harmonious nature.
The society may be even faster and more intense and it is proverbially the case. Not only but mainly in the context of the world-historical turn of 1989, this speed also engraved in the consciousness of broader classes of the population.
This experience remained pending, even if the ideology of the permanent change of the digital The great change came now in the domain of the nature. In addition to the eternal place of peace and harmony, the nature emerged, always revolting and producing permanent phenomena of exception [1] .
Nature in Motion
The nature of the peace and wonderful sunsets was banished to the territorial sovereignty of well-visited tourist destinations. The nature sets in motion [2] . It will be difficult to say, then where this movement now precisely stops, we are inclined to the fact, that the nature has already taken power.
In this first thematization of the takeover of the nature, we are immediately confronted with the following question: Put the case that the nature has taken power, what about the society? Has the relation turned symmetrically?
Was it until now so, that the society changed dynamically and quickly and the nature remained forever (if something happened, it was the voice of the supreme powers), and now did the symmetrical turn result? Has the nature taken command through permanent and ever quicker, fury, while the society has begun to stagnate [3] ?
This assumption has plausibility and possibility (legitimacy). It is at this point no irony, but a quite adequate rapprochement for this process, if we remember that after 1989 everything is in order with the society. This conviction exists and says that there are no longer any social alternatives, even if the social life is full of tensions, crisis, conflicts and contradictions. Moreover, the public opinion is (and not this or that interpretation of Fukuyama's thesis of 1989), that which not only knows no alternatives, but which detects any appearance against the conviction with spontaneous and deliberate suspicion.
However, the positions have visibly changed. The unsteady and always unstable nature emerged out of the eternal nature of tranquility and peace. The ever-rapidly developing society became the stagnant society, which not only cannot change, but may not change either; it can at the most be modified by social techniques and changing index numbers of technocratic (or populist) interventions.
This goes also together with what comes finally in question as an option. In the deepest approaches, one should not proceed from such or such natural event, one should assume a largely heuristically still as unrecognized conceived concatenation of numerous natural phenomena, in which whole chain of mediation should be examined in detail.
With this, the nature again touches the globalization from another angle. The nature became the global actor (actress), probably the most powerful actor (actress) in the world. This turn is in every respect of shaking historical importance, especially in the history of the nature itself.
The climate change can be defined according to several logics. One of these logics works with a nominalistic and a realistic determination. In doing so, we adhere to the terminology of the philosophical tradition.
The realistic definition (in which it will be started from the real existence of the categories) sounds in one of its variations as follows: "Climate is a scientific construction, created through the collation of a series of measurements and observations of atmospheric values-primarily temperature, precipitation and wind speed". And: "Climate is a matter of average conditions that do not exist in reality" [4] . As Otto Friedrich Gruppe, philosopher of German language (1804-1876) said, the phenomenon "wind" does not exist-it is just the air… [5] .
The nominalist type of the climate change definition can ultimately do without words. Phenomena of warming of oceans, storms, extreme
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The picture from the fifties of the last century appears to us more relevant, on which the black smoke from all the chimneys of the working factories went upwards in the direction of the sky, and the best factory and the best painting were the ones, which were sending the blackest smoke and in the greatest amount toward the sky, for the quality of the smoke was the proof of the quantity and quality of the production and therefore quite positive.
Nature and society have always been in a secret dialogue with each other, forming visible and invisible oppositions, taking over the role of the other and embodying universal values for the other side. Moreover, they formed an almost infinite series of projections, they always embodied what the other half was missing. The supernatural forces, the myths, and the religions integrated into themselves in the same way and ensured the exchange between them in their own domains.
In the myth and the religion, there is no human society independent of the nature and no nature independent of the society. Not only the society (the culture, the politics, the science) had to develop out of this symbiosis, also the independent nature had to develop out of the divine supremacy.
Modern societies experienced, step by step, their furious political, economic, and intellectual dynamics, and they also gradually made of the process their own Max Weberian disenchantment (from which they again seldom longed to return to an undisturbed nature).
A relevant intellectual, who considered seriously this raging dynamic of the modernity in the second half of the nineteenth century, was Max Nordau. How he saw the then prevalent difference between society (culture) and nature shows that he changed his name from Südfeld to Nordau. Thus, he proved that he considered the nature as an unchanging and solid contrast to the society (culture). For him, the "South" and the "North" meant fixed entities that had their cultural and social equivalents.
Certainly no intellectual would come to a similar idea today, for today neither the South nor the North means a fixed entity, and indeed neither socially (culturally) nor climatically.
The Mutual Protection
It is no longer a privilege of Nietzsche, to require a "dangerous life" for the future creative individuals. The way from Friedrich Nietzsche to Ulrich Beck is the raise of a global risk society and sustainable development.
The actorial action radius of the diverse global protagonists remains of high importance. This actorial freedom can promote the framework of an optimal sustainable development, but it can favour also the mutual rivalry within globalization, which generates and accelerates global conflicts. At the same time, the nature became real global actor, probably the most powerful actor of all.
It is not about the fact, that this change is historical in the history of the nature. This change is historical also in the history of the humanity. Until now, we protected the nature against the society, now we must also protect the society against the nature. The decisive change is the transformation of the idea of the nature protection in a practice of the mutual and double protection of the nature and the society. In the singular mission of this double protection, it is crucial, Now, the original idea of a new identity of the nature, or the potential natural risks seem to have thus disappeared, so an identity seems to have perished in a world of the so-called "secondary" competition.
It seems to us all the more interesting, that precisely in this situation the apparently impossible politics of identity (neither in the direction of the nature nor in the direction of the society) gained again a new impulse in the past time. This again raises the question of an identity, that can also become relevant in the relation to the nature.
However, if one looks at the most interesting new phenomenon of identity, one is confronted to a quite different reality.
One of the most peculiar phenomena just of the recent years is a new politics of identity, which is slowly appearing in the literature.
The identity has in fact a range of social phenomena, so that kind of the politics of identity could also be as multiple in nature and constitution. A complete description of all possibilities would be an impossible enterprise.
It should be remarked at the beginning, that the politics of identity has most often its meaning in a context, in which general and universal politics is also genuinely exercised and the politics of identity can adopt its place in a political life, that functions in its entirety.
The today's politics of identity is a completely different one. It does not go back to the (ideal-typical) right politics of identity and articulates the frustration and desperation of the majority, which again finds in a coalition of numerous successful politics of identity no general, universal politics, of the tradition, of the common good. The new politics of identity is one of the new majority reflecting its defeat, it is an expression of naked identity. Therefore, it is far from true, if one associates in the modern literature this politics of identity with the problem of recognition (as if the absence of recognition were the cause of the despair and frustration of this politics). This view is intellectually problematic, politically however clearly euphemistic [6] .
New Risks, New Society
We started from the question of whether Ulrich Beck's idea from the 1980s about the possibility of a new identity in the face of the natural disasters would be possible today [7] .
We came to the conclusion that, from a theoretical point of view, the current situation is not favorable to the development of a new global human-ecological identity, which can face the new climate change.
On the one hand, there is the "sublime" (Kant) world of the climate change-on the other hand, there is the naked identity of many, who first want to return to the society.
Under these conditions, the world society is confronted with the climate change.
When we called the qualitative turn "takeover of the nature", we always wanted to emphasize, that it is only a "reading" of what is going on, an interpretation that summarizes the many different and often unexplored processes into a uniform framework. This might be another chapter in the dialogue between nature and society. It might indeed mean a primitive obstacle, if one would follow Margaret Thatcher's advice and accordingly think, that "no society exists, only individuals exist". This might be a macabre confrontation, if we would just emancipate ourselves and imagine free individuals, that would fight against the phenomenon of ocean warming.
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For that is just the one side, today there is no one who exchanges his name "Südfeld" with another name "Nordau". This insight is certainly not sufficient today, it would require a disproportionate high increase of consciousness of the human activity.
This necessity would be urgent at the same time in two directions. One would be the rethinking of what man does actively vis-à-vis the nature, and the other the rethinking of how one can even come to trace what and with which consequences man has changed in the nature. Here again we remind of the moments of the new identity phenomena (the "naked" identity) and the hypothetically supposed "stagnation" of the society (in comparison to the "dynamics" of the nature).
As It is almost impossible to assert where the frontier today between climate change and risk society can be drawn. Both phenomena interweave in infinitely many channels, without that the fundamental logical difference between both basic concepts could be eliminated. Practically, the assumption is that the "climate change" environment is seen as a single large, comprehensive risk society, and the detailed analysis must indicate which proportion of a current phenomenon of climate change may have the traditional concept of risk, i.e. the human intervention in the natural processes.
A new analogy comes up at this point. We are not concerned with the exact truth content of this analogy, we only want to signal a heuristic possibility. It can namely easily be the case that the climate research came into a similar situation as the ethnography in the mid-twentieth century when, with dismay, it had to be established with Claude Lévy-Strauss that so something like really "wild", really "natural" communities or societies is no longer existing! Wherever the explorers always went, they encountered human communities, which had been hit hard by the "civilization" and thus transformed.
Even such a view of the climate change as global risk society (only understood as a purely pragmatic, i.e. not really theoretical option) is by no means identical with a complete theory of the society. It is simplified in the fact that a society, the theoretical description of which we dispose under conditions, is coming, in which the potentially permanent risks are characteristic. When and how this change is expressing in a new theory of the society, cannot be established today. In the dialogue between nature and society, it can however no longer be only said, that only man ruins the nature, the nature can also ruin the man, but so, that man had a considerable share in the birth of this nature. It means, men are actors in ruining themselves by the nature.
Conclusion
It is not only the contrast of the normal-small and the infinite-great that determines however the investigation of the climate change. In another comparison, the development of climate change reminds of the futurology. It is an "iron law" that everything that is still
running is "open", it means, everything that is moving, can end also in multiple ways. We do not want to address the multiple documents of the everyday consciousness and of the other historical documents,
as an example we mention the widespread ideas, that "we can win the war" while the enemy was already on the backlines.
The "iron law" of social practice states, that the society does not consider a fact as complete until a result is not ready. And it is easy to see which huge problem it can represent in the elaboration of the strategy versus the climate change, as long as a fact is not accomplished, it can consider the society as "open". It is also not to be underestimated, that in the case of a really long-term process, the actorial relations also erode-above all the responsibility for the participation of a negatively affecting process in the climate change.
The iron law means: a certain degree of long-term becomes immediately the collective irresponsibility.
In comparison to the risk problematic of the eighties, it is also noticeable how clearly the singular technical-scientific solutions dominated the domain in resolving the ecological problems. In the majority of cases, this condition also formed the basis of the cooperation between the production and the green nature-protecting movements, but the technical, scientific individual actions led to those compromises, that have legitimized the green movement and gave the production the opportunity to give a better face to the population.
The technical and scientific individual compromises did not lose their importance today. The difference versus the 1980s became enormous, because, on the one hand, the number of such individual compromises became extremely high and, on the other hand (what is much more important) the pure sum of positively independent individual compromises does not guarantee more, that the holistic process of the climate change generally disappears or even declines or even more, one cannot even estimate to what extent the assumed total number of positively independent individual compromises influences the process of the climate change. It seems to us that the idea of this historical and factual shift can make it easier to understand the essential trains of the current climate change.
The still very sharp boundaries of the "technical" and the "social" risks of that time are also blurred, above all because of the extremely complex composition of a new risk phenomenon.
